Introduction
In the first part of the paper we introduce a new theorem-proving procedure, that is a new eflcierlt method of communicafirrg a proof: Any such method implies, directly or indirectly, a definition of proof. Our "proofs" arc probabilistic in nature. On input an II-bits long statement, we may erroneously be convinced of its correctness with very small probability, say, -$, and rightfblly be convinced of its 1 correctness with very high probability, say, 1 --.
2"
Our proofs are Clreruclhre. To eficicntly verify the correctness of a statement, the "recipient" of the proof must actively ask questions and receive answers from the "prover".
In the second part of the paper, we address the following question:
How much knowledge should be communicated fir proving a theorem T?
Certainly enough to see that T is true, but usually much more. For instance, to prove that a graph is Hamiltonian it suffices to exhibit an Hamiltonian tour. This appears, however, to contain ,much additional knowledge than the single bit "HamiltonianInonHamiltonian".
We give a computational complexity measure of knowledge and measure tic amount of additional knowlcdgc contained in proofs.
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Of particular interest is the case where this additional knowledge is essentially 0 and we show that is possible to interactively prove that a number is quadratic non residue mod m releasing 0 additional knowledge. This is surprising as no efficient algorithm for deciding quadratic rcsiduosity mod m is known when m's factorization is not given. Moreover, all known NP proofs for this problem exhibit the prime factorization of tn. This indicates that adding interaction to the proving process, may decrease the amount of knowledge that must be communicated in order to prove a theorem.
Interactive Proof Systems
Much effort has been previously devoted to make precise the notion of a theorem-proving procedure, NP constitutes a very successful formalization of this notion. Loosely speaking, a theorem is in provable in NP if its proof is easy to verify once it has been found. Let us recall Cook's [C] (and independently Letin's [t] ) influential definition of NP in this light.
The NP proof-system consists of two communicating Turing machines A and a : respectively, the prover and the verifier. The prover is exponential-time. the verifier is polynomial-time. Both A and f? arc dctcrministic, read a common input and interact in a very elementary way. On input a string .Y, belonging to an NP language L, A computes a string y (whose length is bounded by a polynomial in the lcngtb of X) and writes y on a special tape that B can read. B then checks that fLib)=x (where f, is a polynomial-time computable function relative to the language 1,) and, if so, halts and accepts. This process is illusuatcd in figure 1.
Fig. 1:
The Nf proof-system(') What is intuitively required From a theoremproving procedure? First that it is possible to "prove" a true theorem. Sccomd, that it is impossible to "prove" a false theorem. Third, that communicating a proof should be cfhcient. in the following sense.
-. It does not matter how long must the prover compute during the proving process, but it is essential that the computation rcquircd from tbc verifier is easy.
Theorem-proving procedures differ in the underlying definition of a proof. The notion of a proof, like the notion of a computation, is an intuitive one. Intuition, however, may alnd must be formalized. Computability by (detcrminist.ic) Turing machines is an elegant example of formalization of'thc intuitive concept of a computation. Each formalization. however, cannot entirely capture our original and intuitive notions, exactly because they are intuitive. Following our intuition, probabilistic algorithms [R] [SS] are means of computing, though they arc not in the previous formal model. Similarly, NP is an elegant formalization of the intuitive notion of a theorem----------___-_____ (9 (By ----> we denote ii read/write head. by ---R -> a read-only head and by ---M-'-> a write-only head) proving procedure. Howcvcr, NP only captures a particular way of communicating a proof. It deals with those proofs that can be "written down in a book". In this paper we introduce interactive proof-systems to capture a more gcncral way of communicating a proof. We deal with those proofs that can be "explained in class". Informally, in a classroom, the lecturer can take full advantage of the possibility of interacting with the "recipients" of the proof. They may ask questions at crucial points of the argument and receive answers. This makes life much easier. Writing, down a proof that can be checked by everybody without interaction is a much harder task. In some sense, because one has to answer in advance ah possible questions. Let us now formally set up the proper computational model.
2.1
Interactive Turing machines and interactive pairs of Turing machines &kyygK T. Fig, , 2: an interactive pair<f Turing machines An interactive Turing machine (ZTIIf) is a Turing machine with a read-only input tape, a work tape and a random tape. The random tape contains an infinite sequence of random bits. The random tape can be scanned only from left to right. When we say that an interactive machine flips a coin we mean that it reads next bit in its own random tape. This tape is the only source of randomness for the machine. In addition an interactive machine has a read-only communication tape and B write-only communication tape. The head writing on the latter tape moves only from left to right, writes only on a blank cell and cannot move to the right without writing. Two ITM's A and B form an brterucrive pair of Turirrg rtmhiws(/l J) by ,I. 13,. , ,:: 1) letting A and B share the same input tape and 2) letting n's write-only communication tape bc A's read-only communication tape and vice versa. The interactive pair (A ,B) is ordered and machine 8 starts rhc computation. The machines take turns in being active. When, say, A is active it can perform internal computation, mad and write on the proper tapes and send a mcssagc to B by writing on the appropriate communication tape. The ith message of A is the entire string that A writes on the communication tape during its ith turn. The ith mcssagc of B is similarly defined. Either machine can, during its turn, terminate the computation of the pair. Consider a computation of (A .B) on input x. Let the computation consist of II turns and let a, be A *s ith message and b, be B's ith message. Thea the lext of rhe compulalion is defined to be the scqucncc {b l, Ul, . . b ,b,,u,,) . (a, is empty if it is 13 that halts the computation of (A ,B) in its n th turn). The text of all possible computations of A and B on input x will be of re!cvance to our analysis and it will bc dcnotcd by (A .B)[x] . This set has the structure of a probability space in the natural way. The probability of each computation in (A ,B)[x] is taken over the coin tosses of both machines.
lntcractivc proof-systems
Let I,ClO.l}' be a language and (A ,B) an interactive pair of Turing machmes. We say that (A , B) is an inreraclive proofsysrem for L if A (the prover) has infinite power, B (the ver$er) is polynomial time and they satisfy the following properties. 1) For any x EL given as input to (A ,B), B halts and accepts with probability at least 1-s for each k and sufficiently large n.
2)
For any ITM A' and for any,rx not in L given as input to (A ',B), B accepts with probability at most .L ,~ for each k and sufficiently large n.
Here 11 denotes the length of the input and the probabilitics arc taken only over B's own coin tosses.
Condition 1 csscntially says that. if xEL, there exist a way to easily prove this fact to B that succeeds with ovcrwhclming probability. This way is A's algorithm. In other words, it is possible to prove a true thcorcm so that the proofs arc easily verified (B is polyllomial-tilnc) . Condition 2 says that, if x not in L, thcrc exist no strategy, for convincing B of the contrary, that succeeds with non negligible probability. In other words, no one can prove a false theorem. In fact, B needs not to trust (or to know) the machine with which it is interacting. It is enough for B to trust the randomness of its own coin tosses. Notice that, as for NP, the emphasis is on the "yesinstances": if a string is in the language we want to show it, if it is not WC do not care. Let us consider an example of an interactive proof-system. Example 1: Let Zl dcnotc the set of integers bctwccn 1 and Tut that arc relatively prime with m. An elcmcnt afZi is a quadruhc residue mod n if a =x2 mod tn for some x CZi. clsc it is a quadruric nonresidue. Now let I. -7{()~ .x) l x EZZ is a quadratic nonrcsiduc }. Notice that IA ENP: a prover needs only to compute the factorization of ~1 and send it to the verifier without any further interaction. nut looking ahead to zero knowledge proof-systems, WC will consider a more interesting interactive proof-system for L. The vcrificr B begins by choosing n = lnr 1 random mcmbcrs of Zi, (rl,r2 ,. .., r"}. For each i, l<isn, hc flips a coin, and if it comes up heads hc forms r, = r,' mod tn, and if it comes up tails he forms ~,=x-r,~ mod m. Then B sends fl,fz ,..., r, to A. The prover, having unrcstrictcd computing power, finds which of the r, arc quadratic rcsiducs, and uses this information to tell B the results of his last n coin tosses. If this information is correct, B accepts.
Why dots this work? If (m,x)EL, then A correctly predicts all last II coin tosses of B who will dcfinitcly accept. If (m.x) not in L. then the {Ii} are just random quadratic rcsiducs. and the prover will respond correctly in the last part of the computation with probability $. In fact. for each of the last n coin tosses of B, A has probability exactly l/2 of guessing it correctly.
A more complex intcractivc prloof-system for L. that releases essentially 0 additional knowlcdgc, can be found in section 4.2.
Intcractivc Complrxity Classes
We dcfinc IP, Interactive Pol)?totttial-ritt~e, to be the class of languages possessing an intcractivc proofsystem. In this case we may also say that I, is intcractively provable. To cmphasizc that the prover has unlimited power, we may write IP, for If. To closer analyze the role of the prover, we dcfmc If",,,, to be the class of languages having an interactive proofsystem whose prover runs in time T(n). To focus on the role of mtcmction, we Ict fPLf(n)] denote the class of languages having a proof-system that, on input a string x of length tl, halts within f(n) turns. Here f is a non decreasing function from natural numbers to natural numbers.
Interactive proof-systems should be contrasted with the "Arthur-Merlin" games of Babai [B] . In those games Merlin plays the role of n and Arthur the role of R. The big difference is that Merlin sees all results of Arthur's coin tosses. This allows Babai to prove that arbitrary interaction lis not necessary in his framework: it is suficicnt to al'low Arthur to talk to Merlin and have Merlin respo:nd; at least as long they alternate a constant number of times. Actually Arthur's message to Merlin consists exactly of the sequence of its own coin tosses. (See figure 3) . then, for any random oracle 0, I; GNP0 with probability 1. It is apparent that AMCIP (actually, AMcf.P[l]) and we bclicvc that the inclusion is a strict one. We also believe that our "intcractivc hierarchy" dots not collapse, i.e. that Il'(k] is strictly contained in fl'[k +l]. In any case, intcractivc proof-systems arc the right proof model to both analyze and rcducc the knowlcdgc complexity of a language. Next section is dcvotcd to the discussion of this more subtlc notion. Let us also mention Papadimitriou' [P] "games against nature". This is an elegant characterization of PSPACE, though not an efficient :method of communicating a proof.
K~~owledge Complexity
Communication is a tool for transferring or exchanging knowledge. Knowlcdgc has received a lot of attention in a model-theoretic framework [FHV] , [HM] . In this context, roughly speaking, 1) All parricipanrs are considered to have i&ire cotqxuing power. (E.g. each participant "knows" all logical conscqucnccs of the information in his hands) and
2)
The objecr Ihey rty lo "know berfer" is not an available public input. (Rather some event occurs that is witnessed or noticed by w but not 4 participants. To give an elementary example, one participant flips a coin and tells the outcome to a few others who now "know" it. The remaining participants do not "know" what the outcome was and they have to decide between two possible worlds: one in which "heads" came up and one in which "tails" came up). This scenario may not bc realistic in many practical contexts. In physics. for example, scientists have bourtded <resources and the object they try to know better is a public ittpur: nature. Our point of view is that 1) Knowledge is a norion relafive IO a spectftc model of cotnpu ta!iotJ wirh specified cottlpuring resources and 2) One studies and gains knowledge about available objecrs In this paper WC mcasurc the amount of knowledge that can be gained from a communication by a participant with polynomially bounded resources and invcstigatc how much knowledge must bc communicatcd for proving a thcorcm!') Our computational complexity measure of knowlcdgc is. howcvcr. of wider applicability. For example, as skctchcd in scction 6. ir constitutes a powerful tool for dcvcloping a mathematical theory of cryptographic protocols, The following concept will be crucial to our analysis.
3.1 Degrees of distinguishability for probability distributions Let I be an infinite set of strings and c a positive constant. For each x EI with length n, Ict lI, be a probability distribution over the II'-bit strings. Then w Bay ti i&~tr.(IT~ 1 u E8) is a I-c-ensemble. By saying that l-I is an erlsemble or a I-eruemble we mean, respectively, that there exist I and c or simply c such that iI is a I-c-ensemble.
A disrillguishet is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D that on input a string s outputs a bit b. Let II,={Il,,,IxE1} and l12={lI~,xIxEZ} bc two I-c-ensembles. Let p$ denote the probability that D outputs 1 on input a 1 x 1 '-bit long string randomly selected with probability distribution lI,,X. Symmetrically, pf'* denotes the probability that D outputs 1 on input a Ix ('-bit long string randomly selected with probability distribution II,,. Of particular interest will be the notion of at most O-distinguishability (or indistinguishability). In this case the two ensembles are "equal" with respect to any polynomial-time computation. In section 4.2 we will prcscnt an interesting example of indiscinguishablc cnscmblcs. In this example. the n,,, and 172,X arc indistinguishable in a stronger scnsc. In fact the probability that they assign to each 1 x ('-bit string is identical except for a set of stings strings ------------______
(2) Our definitions may be given with respect to any time bound. but wc restrict our attention to polynomial-time both to Amplify the matter a bit and because we believe that it constitutes the most important case. 1 whose total probability dots not exceed -24"l for some constant d bctwccn 0 and 1. Such strong indis tir.guishability is a luxury not always available and, in any case. is ?ot ncccssary to dcvclop our theory.
Notice that our distinguishcrs are Fed with a single I x I'-bit string at a time. One may consider dis tinguishcrs that arc fed with more strings of length I x I c at the same time. In this case, if two ensemble are O-distinguishable, they will remain undistinguishable (as long "more" < poly ( I x I )). If the two ensembles arc at most p-distinguishable, they may remain at most p-distinguishable or the probability of "distinguishing" them may become much higher. (This plays a role for deciding whether a certain cryptographic protocol may be played securely more than once using the same secret key).
Related notions of indistinguishability. have been previously considered in [GM] in the context of probabilistic encryption and then in [y] and [GGMJ in the context of pseudo-random number generation.
The knowledge computable from a communication
Which communications convey knowledge? Informally, those that transmit the output of an unfeasible computation. a computation that we cannot perform ourselves. For example, if A sends to B n random bits, this will be 11 bits of information. We would say this contains no knowledge, however, because B could generate random bits by himself. Similarly, the result of any probabilistic polynomialtime computation will not contain any knowledge. With this in mind we would like to derive an upper bound (exprcsscd in bits) for the amounf of knowledge that a polynomially bounded B can extract from a communication.
First a bit of notation. Notice that any probabilistic Turing machine Al gcneratcs the ensemble wl=Mxl3,cl. where ,U[x] dcnotcs the set of possible outputs of Al (on input xEI) taken with the probability distribution induced by Al's coin tosses. Similarly, we will dcnotc by (n.B)l] the cnscmble associated to an interactive pair of Turing machines (n,B). WC arc now ready to introduce our dclinition. Remark 1: Assume AI, on input x, tries to select a string "as undistinguishable as possible" from a computation randomly sclectcd in (A ,O) [x] . Note that in this attempt no information is hidden from Jl: A 's program, R's program and x arc all inputs of M. A{ may have "built in" the description of A. This, however, is not of great help, as A 's algorithm may be absolutely inefficient.
A non mathematical discussion: Let us try to illustrate the above definitions. Assume that a crime x has happened, B is a reporter and ,4 a police officer. A understands the rights of the press but, for obvious reasons, also tries not to communicate too much knowledge. Should reporter B call the police officer n to know more about x? It depends. If he has probability csscntially equal to 1 of gcncrating at home, in front of his typewriter, the "same" conversations about this specific x that he might have with A, he should not bother to call. A will give him essentially 0 knowledge about x. If, instead. say, he may gcncrare an honest conversation about x with probability lr'4 (i.e. what he generates is at most 3/4-distinguishable from the "real" conversations), then the officer may tell him something that he dots not know. Tlhis knowledge however, will not exceed two bits and may not bc of the "useful" kind! Still, it may pay off to call. If. finally, B has only chance 1 in 2'O" of generating the possible conversations about x with the police ofliccr, then A is a real gossiper and B should rush to the telephone! Assume now that B is so news-hungry that is ready to bccomc dishonest during the phone conversation, i.e. hc is ready to transform himself to B'. Dcspitc this, if the officer is so skillful to bc one who communicates, say, at most 2 bits of knowledge, no matter how tricky questions 8' asks and how much he cheats, he will not get out of him more than two bits about x. (Here WC arc implicitly assuming that a cheating reporter still remains a polynomial-time one!) Example 2: Consider the ITM (A , B) of example 1. Restrict its inputs only to the strings in L. Then A communicates at most 0 bits of knowledge to B. In fact, them exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine AI such that (for those inputs) generates exactly the same cnscmblc that (,4 ,B) does. Essentially, Al can simulate B. as B is polynomial-time, and simulates A by_looking at R's coin tosse3 as follows. When U sends r, computed by squaring r,, M will answer "quadratic residue". When B sends r, computed by squaring r, and then multiplying it by x, A,/ answers "quadratic nonresidue". Notice, however, that, if the problem of deciding quadratic rcsiduosity is not in probabilistic polynomialtime, A does not communicate at most 0 bits of .-knowledge. in fact, some machine B', interacting with A, may decide to create the Ii's in a different way. For instance, such a B may send the, sequence of integers r, -i and therefore receive an answer about their quadratic residuosiry that it may not be able to compute by itself. An interesting ITM A that communicates at most 0 bits of knowledge may be found in section 4.2.
The knowledge complexity of a Isnguage
How much knowledge should be communicated to provide a proof of a tbcorem T? Certainly enough to verify that T is true. Usually, much more. For example. to prove that a certain aC2; is a quadratic rcsiduc, it is sufficient to, communicate an x such that a =x2 mod tn. This communication, however, contains more knowledge than just the fact that P is a quadratic residue. It communicates a square root of a. We intend to measure the additional knowledge that a prover gives to a verifier during a proof, and investigate. whcther:this,additional knowledge ma) bc essentially 0.
Definition: Let L bc a language possessing an intcractivc proof-system (A ,B). Let f: N --) N be non decreasing. WC say that L has knowledge cotnplexily f(n) if, when restricting the inputs of (R,R) to the strings in L A communicates at most f(n ) bits of knowledge. We denote this fact by L EKC( f(n) ).
.4n informal discussion. Let us recall that WC arc concentrating on the "yes-instances". When a string x is not in the language the prover "gives up" and WC do not mcasurc knowledge. When, instead, xEL, what is the verifier's point of view at the end of an intcractlve proof? First, it is "convinced" (correctly with overwhelming probability) that x EL. This was the goal of the proof-system in the first place. Second, it possesses the text of the entire computation with the prover on input X. This text, has been used to verify that xEL, but dots not contain more than f(n) bits of additional knowledge. In fact, on input xEI,, we are guaranteed to be able to easily generate such texts with probability distribution ak most (l--&)-distinguishable from the "real" texts, no maftcr with which machine B' A is interacting. The special case L EKC (0) is of particular interest. In this case, by interacting with A and from the text of the computation, B can verify that x EL , but, with respect to polynomial-time computation, the text is irrclcvant for any other purpose, no matter with which B' A is interacting. In fdct, on input a guaranteed xEL, such texts can be easily selected with essentialiy the right probability distribution and without A.
We believe that. knowledge complexity is one of the fundamental parameters of a language or, equivalently, of a theorem-proving procedure. Theorem-proving procedures are intended to communicate knowlcdgc and it is very natural to classify them according to the amount of knowledge they communicate.
Note that knowledge complexity is also defined for NP proof-systems as they are a special type of interactive proof-system. However, their knowledge complexity tends to be very high.
A rvcry important application of knowledge complcxity is that it cnablcs proving correctness of cryptographic protocols in a modular way (see section 6).
Languages in KC(O)
Every language in P or RP or BPP has trivially knowledge complexity 0. If L is not in probabilistic polynomial-time, no NP proof-system for L can release 0 additional knowledge. However, there may bc a more interactive proof-system for L that does relcasc 0 additional knowledge. A natural question arises, Do meaningful examples of languages in KC(O) exist or is KC(O)-BPP a fancy way to define the empty set? A similar question could bc asked for, say, RP. Namely, is RP-P a fancy name for the empty set? The best sign of a possible negative answer to the latter question is constituted by the fact that primality testing is in RP [SS] [R] and, while the problem of dctcnninistically deciding primality has received a lot of attention for centuries, no polynomial-time algorithm is currently known. Similarly, it is of great intcrcst to find candidates for languages in KC(O) but not in, say, BPP. This is the best one can do, given our current knowledge about proving lower-bounds.
We know of two interesting languages that have knowledge complexity 0. Both are algebraic. The first one is the following language BL proposed by Blum in [Bll] where he gives all the essential ingredients to prove BL UC(O). Let )I be an integer with prime factorization n =p:l -p:'. Then n f BL if the number of different p,s congruent to 3 mod 4 is even. The other language that is known to belong to KC(O) is the well known quadratic non-residuosity language. We give a proof of this fact in this section. Our proof that LEK(0) dots not dcpcnd on any unproved computational complexity assumptions.
WC first rcvjew what is known about the complexity of deciding membership in this Ilanguage.
The Quadratic Rcsiduosity .Problcm
The quadratic residuosity problem with parametcrs mEA' and xEZ~ consists of computing Q,,(x). If the factorization of m is known, it is trivial to compute Q,,,. If the factorization of m is unknown, then there is no known efficient procedure for computing Q,,,. This decision problem is one of the four main problems discussed by Gauss in "Disquisitiones Arithmeticac" (1801) (along with primality testing, integer factorization and Solvability o:f Diophantinc Equations). A polynomial time soluti.on for it would Imply a probabilistic polynomial time solution for other open problems in Number Theory such as deciding whether a composite integer m is a product of 2 or 3 primes.
The Jacobi symbol (2) for nr EN and xfZ: is a polynomial time computable function that evaluates to 1 and -1 and provides some information about Qm(x). Namely, if (:)= -1 then Q,,,(x)=l. However, when (i)=l then computing Q,(x) is a hard problem. n fact., it is not even known how to efficiently produce a single "guaranteed" quadratic nonresidue mod nt with Jacobi symbol 1.
4.2 A "0" Knowledge Interactive Proof System for L In the proof system, (A,B:), that we exhibit for O,,m)EL the prover A is only rcquircd to be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with the additional power of being able to evaluate Q,. ( Of course, it remains true that no infinitely powerful A' can convince 13 that y is a quadratic non-residue mod m if that is not the case ). For simplicity, we only consider proving that (y,?ft)EI, when the Jacobi symbol (x)=1. The case where (ij= -1 is uninteresting. We specify A and B by giving-their explicit program at each step of the interaction.
The basic idea is that B generates numbers of two types: x =9 mod I)? (type 1) and x =y.r2 mod m (type 2) where r is randomly chnscn, and quizzes A about them. If indeed (y .nt) is in L, then A cam tell the types of these numbers. If @ ,m) is not in L , they look all the same to A and it will fail the quizzes with very high probabiilty. The danger with this basic idea arises when indeed ~,uI) is in L as A , when answering the quizzes, may release some knowledge other than b,m)EL (e.g. the quadratic residuosity of specific other xG$ chosen by a cheating B'). We ovcrcomc this danger, by having A make sure that the machine with which it is interacting "knows" what are the types of the numbers it quizzes A about.
A and B's Interactive Program
Input: b,nr)EL such that (i)=l and n =logzm.
Initialize ilerarion =O.
Step 1 Remark 2: Note that if A,B both operate according to specification, then each iteration of the program will be completed with probability > l-f for 0 < c 5: 1.
The following claims l&2 hold for each complctcd iteration. Claim 1: If (y .nr) is not in L, then A ( or any other A ' ) correctly gucsscd C, ( i.e sends v=C,), with 1 probability exactly T.
proof: The proof folIows from the fact that C, =0 with probability exactly t and that even with infinite computation power A' can't distinguish between a computation with B in which C, =0 from one in which C, =l. The latter can be seen as follows. Suppose C,'=O.
Then, in step 3 for all r, EX, A receives ror, =dG = d m mod m. Note that q =1,*x mod 1~ is a random square, (as f, is) and ror, is a random square root of e, mod m. for all w, A receives dym mod VI. Note that f, =y+x =y2*r$x mod m is a random square, (as r,2 is) and y$ro-r, is a random square root of f, mod m.
Then, in step 3, for a11 f, EX, A receives y-rO-rt=dy.f;x =dy'r:rl mod m. Note that Zi =y-f,.x mod 1~ is a random square, (as both y and f, arc now squares and r, is a random square) and y~,r, is a random square root of 2, mod m. for all f, E Y, A receives y-to-r, = d z mod m, Note that f, =I,.x =y'-$.ri mod m is a random square, [as r: is) and y-roar, is a random square root of j, mod m. Thus, for both C, =0 and C, =1 A will still receive random square roots of random squares. Therefore A can't have any advantage in predicting C,. Claim 2: If (y,,n) in L, then A correctly computed C, in step 4. Theorem 1: (A.B) is an interactive proof-system for L. Proof: For every (y .nr )E L given as input to (A,B) , B hahs and accepts with probability greater than (1 -f) for all constants 0 < c 5 1 and sufficiently large n . This follows by claim 2. For any machine A ' and for any ~,TH) not in L, given as input to (A 'J), B accepts with probability at most f by claim 1 and remark 3.
We now proceed to show that L has knowledge complexity 0.
Theorem 2: L has knowledge complexity 0.
Proof: To show that (A .R) constitutes a 0 knowledge proof-system for L, we must show that for each polynomial-time ITM B'. thcrc exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Machine M, such that the two enscml&s 1!!1] and (A , B ')I ] are indistinguishable. The basic idea is that Ai can easily simulate B', as B' runs in polynomial time. On the other hand, M will succeed in simulating A, by running B' twice with the same coin tosses. A more precise description of M is the following: On input (~~.rn)cL, M randomly fills the random tape of B' with a sufficiently long string R, and makes B' perform "its own version" of step 1. (B' may in fact execute a different algorithm than. R during step 1.) Simulating A in step 2 is easy for M, as all A does here is picking a random subset. Next, M makes 8' perform its own version of step 3. Now, M must simulate A in step 4. Notice that it is easy to check whether A will halt in step 4. 'Thcrcfore it will be easy for M to simulate A in a computation with B' in which A halts in step 4. Difficulti:es arise if A won't halt but continue, This implies that A, must compute Q,,,(x) correctly as A does. This is easy to do for A who has enough power to decide the quadratic residuosity of X. Notice that this would also be easy for AI if B', either generated x by squaring mod m an ro that A! may observe ( in which case M knows that Q,(x)=O), or if B' generated x bly squaring mod R an r. and multiplying by y ( in which case M knows that Q,(x)=l).
However, life may be not so easy. B' might have generated x in some other way (e.g. at random) which would make it h.ard for M to compute Q,,,(X). We overcome this difficulty as follows.
BY CI.C~.C~,... we denote fixed, positive constants depending on A and B'. Without. loss of generality, we may assume that on input @,tn), A will halt in step 4 with probability less than 1 ---. ' (Otherwise p* by simulating A and B' for steps 1.,2 and 3. as above, and having A halt in step 4. WC triv.ially gcncrate computations which arc indistinguishable from (A 9mJJ,mll. At the end of step 3, Al saves all messages sent so far by B' and the "virtual" A. M now runs B' again with the same input (y,m) and the same content R in the random tape of R ', For this second compuation, M simulates A anew. by flipping new coins. Four things will happen in this second computation.
1)
3) 4) M B ' sends in step 1 the same sets 5' and T, as in its first computation. In step 2, A will select a random subset iC_TUS.
With probability greater than 1-L 2czn '
Z#Z (where Z denotes the set chosen in the first computation).
In step 3, B sends the sets k and p. (The respcctivc sets in the first compuation were X' and Y '). With probability > 1 -4, 2 and y 23 are of the right form (i.e could not cause the legal A to halt).
With probability > 1 -4, 2*:x' and h Y'.
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now sclccts an element r,E(T -X')n,$* As I,ET-X', in the first computation B' sent its corresponding ri. As r, Ef . in the second computation B' sends 4 x!, mod m or J xr,V mod In. Now, in whatever case, it is just a matter of algebra for M to easily compute r. such that ri =x mod m or ri-y=x mod tn. If O),m)EL, exactly one of,these casts may occur. Therefore M, having computed rh can simulate A by sending a v = Q&). An informal dcfinitiow One advantage of the point of view of Remark 3 is that it allows one to express in a clean way notions like "the polynomialtime machine B knew x at some point of its computation". Let us consider a particular example. Assume that machine B started computing on input k and outputs a k-bit integer M. B may have randomly selected two primes p1 and pz, multiplied them together to produce m, then "erased" pl and p2 and output ~1. What could one mean by saying that B knew the factorization of m? A natural choice is that B is able to compute it. In a narrow scnsc, this may mean that, in performing next instruction, B will output 01's factorization or that it was written, say, at the beginning of B's work-tape at some point in time. In a broader sense it may mean that if a probabilistic polynomial-time machine A4 "monitors" the sequence of istantaneous descriptions of B's computation, then M outputs nt's factorization with very high probability in poly(k) time. This, however, may not be general enough. In fact, "extracting" N'S factorization may not be easy for M, and still B had enough "potential" to efficiently compute it (though B's program may never explicitly do so Full details will be given in the final paper.
Applications to Cryptographic Protocols
Given our current state of knowledge about lower bounds, the security of a cryptographic protocol must bc proved based on the intractability assumption of some candidate hard problem. lln~s one must accept that further analysis may reveal some candidate hard problems to be efficiently solvable. What is not acceptable is that a protocol may be broken without violating the rclativc intractability assumntion.
In traditional computational complexity or communication complexity, the goal is to communicate as much knowledge as possible as. efficiently as possible. Since all participants arc considcrcd good friends, no one carts if more knowlcdgc than ncccssary is communicatcd. The situation with respect to cryptographic protocols is very different. In this cast there is generally no problem at all communicating the knowlcdgc efficiently, but the whole problem is making sure not too ntuch knowledge has been communicated.
Model theoretic knowledge has been used to analyze protocols. For example, in [HR] it has been used co prove Rabin's "Oblivious Transfer" correct In some setting. Howcvcr. as pointed out in [FMR] , Rabin's oblivious transfer still lacks a proof of correctness in a complexity theoretic framework.
We believe that knowledge complexity provides the right framework to discuss the correctness of crytographic protocols. Applying rhcsc ideas, [FMR] modified Rabin's oblivious transfer so that it can be proved correct. A sketch of this can be found in section 6.1.
Knowledge complexity helps in proving or disproving the correctness of cryptographic protocols as thcsc arc based on the secrecy of some private information and should prcscrve this secrecy. The privacy of some information is what gives us an advantage over our advcrsarics. Let A(licc) possess the prime factorization of an integer n (say n =pi*p2), while B(ob) only knows tr. During a protocol with B, A must protect the privacy of her information. Assume that A can perform each step of the protocol without having even to look at the value of pi and pz. Then it is easy to show that the protocol did not compromise the privacy of n s factorization. It Is also easy to see, however, that the protlocol could not have accomplished any interesting task. In fact A has not made use of her "advantage"! The protocol may accomplish a non-trivial task if, in at lcast one step of it, A performs a computation c that depends on p1 and p2. This raises the question:
Will c(p,,pJ betray to much informorion about p1 and pz?
Classical information theory does not provide an answer to this question. Knowledlge complexity can. In particular, 1) We can quantify the amount of knowledge about p1 and p2 that c conveys and 2) We can design protocols so to minimize this amount of knowledge. If (A .B) is a 0 knowledge interactive proof-system for L, we already saw that, on input ;I EL, A gives B at most one bit of knowledge, namely xEL. (That is 0 additional knowledge). More generally however, we define an upper bound, measured in bits, on the amount of knowlcdgc A gives to B in a particular protocol (to appear in the final paper).
We use this to give an upper bound on the number of times a single protocol or a combination of protocols can be played, using a common secret key, without giving away too much information about the secret key. In addition, trying to measure the amount of knowledge revealed during the cxccution of a protocol about the sccrct, may pin point weaknesses in the design of the protocol. For example the amount of knowledge revealed in a protocol of [BDJ appeared to be unreasonably large. Further analysis by [H] showed that this protocol could be broken if the encryption function used in the protocol is RSA with low exponents or Rabin's function.
A most important application of these ideas is that it allows us to prove corrcctncss of protocols in a modular way. Complex protocols are usually composed of sub-protocols. For instance, many protocols use a sub-protocol for "coin tossing over a tclcphone" (Rlum [Ml] ). However, it is not clear how to use a "normal" definition of correctness of "coin tossing" to prove the correctness of me main protocd In general, it appears that much strungcr definitions for t&se sub-protocols are ncedcd in order to fit them modur larly and cleanly inside larger protocols. Full details will be given in the final paper.
A Modific~~iun of the 4IbM~us Trw&x That Its Provably Equivalent to Facto&g
This section is joint work of IFMR]. The notion of an Oblivious Transfer (OT) has been introduced by Rabin [HR] who also proposed the first protocol implementing it. OT appears useful as a design tool. See for example Blum [B12] and Even Goldreich and Lempel [EGL] . Rabin introduced OT (to be described below) in a number theoretic setting. Mom generally tbc OT can bc vicwcd as a protocol for transfer* a large amounf of knowledge with probability 112 [EGL] . Bcrgcr. Peralta and Tedrick [RPlJ present a correct protocol for "obliviously transferring" a random number. Different from OT, this protocol transfers no knowledge.
The notion of an OT involves two parties A and B and an integer n (product of two large distinct primes) whose factorization is only known to A. A would like to send the factorization of n to B with the following constraints: 1) 13 must have 50% chance of receiving the factorization of n and the other half of the time B should not know any information at all about the factors of n. 2) A should not have any idea whether or not B received the factorization of n. Rabin's protocol relies on the computational difficulty of factoring. However, as described below, there is a potential flow in his protocol: it is possible that B can cheat and factor n with probability much higher than l/2 even if the intractability assumption of factoring holds. Although we cannot prove that B can really cheat, no one has yet been able to prove that B can not. Before proceeding any further, let us desc& Rabin's proposed protocol. We assume that A and B both know n and that A knows its factorization.
Step 1: B chooses a random x, 1 < x 5 n , relatively prime with 11. Then B computes y=x' mod n and sends y to A.
Step 2: A computes a random square root (mod n) z of y and sends z to B. (If no square root exists, A does nothing).
Step 3: B checks that z'=y mod n. (If not, B halts detecting cheating). Let us assume that z*ry mod n. It is well known that y has four square roots mod n that can be written as {x,-x,w,-w}, where B knows x. With probability 50% z will be x or -x and B reccivcs no knowledge With probability 50%. however, z will be w or -w, in which case gccd( n ,x + z) will be a factor of II, allowing B to compute the factorization of n.
Party A cannot cheat by sending back some cleverly chosen square root z of of n: no matter what n dots, zE(x, -x) with probability 50% and zE(w, -w) witn probability again 50% and A cannot know which is the case.
Is it clear, however, that B cannot cheat? We wish it to be the case that at the end of the protocol B cannot factor with probability (much) bigger than l/2, even if B cheats, and we wish to prove this assuming only that factoring is hard. What happens if B does not square any x at a!!, but instead picks a particular cleverly chosen square mod n y to send? Perhaps knowing any square root mod tr of y will allow fl to factor n. That is, perhaps there is a polynomial time algorithm that given n produces a "special" square mod n y, and another polynomial time algorithm that given y,n and any square root of J mod 11 factors n. The point is not that WC have such algorithms, but that no one has proved that the existence of such algorithms contradicts the assumption that factoring is hard. Hence, the proof that Rabin's protocol is correct relies not only on the assumption that factoring is hard, but on an additional complicated and unnatural assumption, essentiaHy that the above algorithms do not exist.
We have been able to prove that a modified version of Rabin's OT is correct. Le. the probability (taken over the possible choices of n and a!! possible random choices of B) that B can factor n in k steps at the end of the protocol, equals l/2 + the probability that B can factor 11 in k steps before the protocol starts. The heart of the modified protocol is that in addition to y, B gives A a minimum knowledge interactive proof that he possesses a square root of y following' the ideas in section 4.2. In particular, such interactive proof will not reveal any information about which square root B knows. Now that we have made sure that B knows one square root of y. when A will give him one of them at random, it is easy to prove that B's probability of factoring n at the end of the protocol equals l/2 + the probability that he had of factoring n before the start of the protocol.
7, Open Problems
Many open problems arise. We only list a few of them. For what time-bound T(n). if any, I&a, c IPT(J
